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This paper documents a negative relationship between country size and 
the share of consumption goods in total exports. A model is developed, 
based on the division of labour and comparative advantage, to explain this 
relationship. Labour is used to produce traded intermediate inputs which 
are used in the production of traded final goods. Large countries gain 
relatively more from comparative advantage than from the division of 
labour, while the opposite is true for small countries. As in the data, large 
countries export a smaller share of final goods and a larger share of 
intermediate goods than small countries.  
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1  Introduction 
 
The recent rise of China has been associated with its (re-)integration with the world 
trading system. In some circles, China is now known as the “factory of the world”, 
producing a large proportion of the world’s manufactured goods (see for example The 
Economist (2015)). A concurrent trend has been the increasing fragmentation of 
production, as final goods are assembled from intermediate inputs which themselves 
are produced in different parts of the world (Jones (2000)). The article in The 
Economist cited above suggests a link between China’s rise and its role in the global 
value chain. However, Hsieh and Ossa (2016) find only small effects on real income 
in the rest of the world, of China’s productivity increase.  
 
There is of course a large theoretical and empirical literature on the importance of 
intermediates trade. The theoretical side has been dominated by models of 
monopolistic competition and economic geography (see the synthesis provided by 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Fujita et al (1999)). On the empirical side, 
Miroudot et al (2009) and Sturgeon and Memedovic (2010) show that intermediate 
inputs represent over half of total goods trade, but that this fraction has actually 
decreased since the 1960s. Implicit in the discussion about the role of China in the 
world trading system is the role of China’s size. The role of country size in 
determining the importance of intermediate goods trade has not heretofore been 
discussed in the literature, and is the main focus of the present paper.  
 
Divide all commodities into consumption goods and intermediate goods (more details 
of the classification are in the next section). Figure 1 shows that, in 2012, there is a 
negative relationship between the share of consumption goods in total exports, and 
the size of the economy as measured by GDP in PPP terms. That is, on average, a 
larger country exports a larger fraction of intermediate goods, and a smaller fraction 
of consumption goods. The correlation coefficient is -0.3025, with a p-value of 0.0005. 
Note that both China and India are outliers; they have much larger shares of 
consumption goods in their exports than would be predicted given their size. Section 
2 provides more formal econometric evidence using a panel of 172 countries from 
1995 to 2015.  
 
Having demonstrated the empirical significance of the negative relationship between 
country size and the share of consumption goods trade, we turn in Sections 3 and 4 
to develop a simple model in which this relationship emerges. Two final goods can be 
produced using intermediate inputs which are produced using labour as the only 
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factor of production. As in Adam Smith (1776), the more the production process can 
be divided into different stages, the larger will be the final output. The division of 
labour is combined with Ricardo’s (1817) comparative advantage, so that countries 
specialise in different subsets of intermediate goods, then trade both intermediate 
and final goods. We show two main results. First, we show the relationship between 
the division of labour and comparative advantage in international trade. Large 
countries gain relatively more from comparative advantage than from the division of 
labour, while the opposite is true for small countries. Second, and consistent with the 
empirical evidence, country size is negatively associated with the share of 
consumption goods in its exports (equivalently, is positively associated with the share 
of intermediate goods in its exports).  
 
Figure 1: Scatterplot of consumption goods as a share of total exports against GDP, 
2012 (𝑁𝑁 = 128).  
 
 
There has been a recent resurgence of interest in models of international trade based 
on the division of labour. A large portion of this literature revolves around models 
based on external scale economies, for instance Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) 
and Ethier and Ruffin (2009). Choi and Yu (2003) survey the earlier literature on 


































alternative treatment. Relative to this literature, the present paper develops an 
explicit model of the division of labour, rather than basing it on external economies.  
 
More closely related to the present paper are Swanson (1999), Zhou (2004), Chaney 
and Ossa (2013), and Soo (2015). Swanson (1999) develops a model in which a larger 
market size leads to productivity gains, because workers specialize in a narrower 
subset of activities. Zhou (2004) develops a very different model which makes a 
similar point. Chaney and Ossa (2013) extend the new trade model of Krugman 
(1979) to allow for multiple production stages. However, Swanson (1999) does not 
explicitly consider the implications of international trade; the structure of the model 
means that this is not a straightforward analysis. In addition, unlike Zhou (2004) 
and Chaney and Ossa (2013), our model is based on perfect competition, so presents 
an alternative approach to the division of labour. In this sense the paper is similar to 
Soo (2015), who also develops a model of trade based on the division of labour, but 
in which the division of labour is limited by both the extent of the market and 
coordination cost. In Soo (2015), there is only trade in intermediate goods. Here, we 
do not consider coordination costs, instead focussing on the role of country size, and 
developing a model in which countries trade both intermediate and final goods.  
 
Also closely related to the present paper are Ethier (1979, 1982). The nature of the 
division of labour in this paper is similar to that in Ethier (1979, 1982). The main 
difference is that here, we explicitly model the division of labour as in Ethier (1982), 
but the production of intermediate inputs is perfectly competitive, whereas Ethier 
(1982) assumes monopolistic competition in the production of intermediate goods. 
Indeed, where Ethier (1982) has two sources of scale economies (internal to the firm, 
and due to the division of labour) and one source of comparative advantage (factor 
endowment differences across countries), in the present paper, there is one source of 
comparative advantage (between final goods), and one source of scale economies (the 
division of labour). In addition, whilst in Ethier (1982) there is, by assumption, no 
trade in final goods, here we allow for trade in both intermediate and final goods.  
 
The next section presents more formal econometric evidence on the relationship 
between country size and the consumption share of exports. Section 3 develops the 
model and outlines the autarkic equilibrium. Section 4 considers the implications of 






2 Empirical evidence 
 
The data used for the empirical analysis has been obtained from the UN Comtrade 
database, for all available countries between 1995 and 2015. We make use of the 
Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification which divides all commodities into 
capital goods, intermediate goods, consumption goods, and “unclassified” (see United 
Nations (2002) for details of the classification). For our analysis, we drop the 
“unclassified” category before calculating the share of each type of good in total 
exports1. Our sample is an unbalanced panel of 172 countries, and, in the sample, the 
share of consumption goods in total exports is 27.7%, while the share of intermediate 
goods is 64.2%, and the share of capital goods is 8.1%. We obtain GDP in real PPP 
terms and population from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.  
 




� = 𝛼𝛼0𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3 ln 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡   (1) 
Where 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is exports of consumption goods, and 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is total exports, of country 𝑖𝑖 in 
year 𝑡𝑡. We include both country and year fixed effects, to control for unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity across countries (for example, differences in industrial 
structure across countries), and country-invariant heterogeneity across time (for 
instance, shocks which are common across countries). By controlling for both country 
and year fixed effects, the coefficient on ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is identified through across-time 
variation within country. That is, 𝛼𝛼2 shows how the consumption share of exports 
changes as a country’s GDP changes.  
 
Changes in the structure of the economy may also influence the consumption share 
of exports. To control for this, we also include a set of country-specific time trends, 




� = 𝛼𝛼0𝑖𝑖 + (𝛼𝛼0𝑖𝑖 × 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼1𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2 ln𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3 ln 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  (2) 
The results from regressing equations (1) and (2) are reported in Table 1. Controlling 
for population, GDP is negatively and significantly related to the consumption goods 
share of exports in all specifications, whether we control only for country fixed effects 
(column (1)), country and year fixed effects (column (2)), or country and year fixed 
effects and a country-specific time trend (column (3)). A one percent increase in 
GDP reduces the consumption goods share of exports by between 0.06 percent and 
                                                          
1 Including the “unclassified” category leads to similar results to those reported below.  
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0.09 percent. On the other hand, controlling for GDP, population has no statistically 
significant effect on the consumption goods share of exports. This suggests that, 
where size matters, it is the size of the economy rather than the population size 
which is important in determining the consumption good share of exports. In general 
these results are robust to various sensitivity analyses as described in Appendix A2.  
 
Table 1: The relationship between the consumption share of exports and country 
size. Dependent variable = consumption goods share of exports.  
 (1) (2) (3) ln(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) -0.074 -0.060 -0.088 
 (0.019)** (0.029)* (0.032)** ln 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 0.039 0.039 0.007 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.087) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.06 0.07 0.52 
𝑁𝑁 × 𝑇𝑇  2,583 2,583 2,583 
N 172 172 172 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Country time trend   Yes 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors clustered by country. + Significant at 10%; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation is by OLS with fixed effects as defined in the table. 
All specifications include observations from 1995 to 2015.  
 
3 The model  
 
In this section we outline the features of a simple model of international trade in 
which countries may export both intermediate and final goods. There are two 
interesting features of the model. First, it shows the relationship between the division 
of labour and comparative advantage. Second, it predicts a negative relationship 
between the size of the economy and the consumption goods share of exports as 
documented in Section 2 above.  
 
There are two countries, 𝑗𝑗 = 𝐻𝐻,𝐹𝐹 for Home and Foreign. Labour is the only factor of 
production, and the two countries have labour endowments 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 . All markets are 
                                                          
2 It is possible that GDP is endogenous in equations (1) and (2). However, whilst total exports may 
influence GDP, it is not immediately obvious how the structure of exports would do so.  
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perfectly competitive. There are two final consumption goods, 1 and 2. Consumer 
utility is identical across countries and takes a Cobb-Douglas form3:  
𝑈𝑈 = 𝐶𝐶1𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶21−𝜃𝜃                                         0 < 𝜃𝜃 < 1    (3) 
Where 𝐶𝐶 denotes consumption of a good. Final goods are produced with intermediate 
inputs. Each country has the ability to produce a number of intermediate inputs 
𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 = 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 , where 𝑟𝑟 < 1  is a constant 4 , and 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗  is small relative to the number of 
possible intermediate inputs. Assume that the intermediate inputs produced in one 
country are different from those produced in the other country. This is an 
Armington-type assumption made for convenience, and may be caused by 
(unmodelled) sector-specific inputs which are unique to each country, for instance 
natural resources. See Soo (2015) for an alternative, more complicated way of 
determining the intermediate goods produced in each country.  
 
As a result, the number of intermediate goods produced by each country (hence the 
extent of the division of labour) is proportional to the size of the market, as in Adam 
Smith’s example. The assumption that larger countries produce a larger variety of 
goods has empirical support from Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Hanson (2012). 
Let the production technology of intermediate inputs be identical across countries:  
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗       (4) 
Production of intermediate inputs occurs under constant returns to scale. As a result 
of equation (4), the price of each intermediate good is, under perfect competition, 
equal to the wage rate in each country. Assume that wage rates are equalised across 
countries, and hence that all intermediate goods have the same price.  
 
All intermediate inputs are used in fixed proportions in the production of final goods, 
and assembly of final goods is assumed to be costless5. Hence let the production 
functions of the final goods in the two countries be:  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻                               𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = (𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻   (5a) 
𝑄𝑄1𝐹𝐹 = (𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1𝑥𝑥1𝐹𝐹                                   𝑄𝑄2𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1𝑥𝑥2𝐹𝐹   (5b) 
Output of each final good depends on the number of Home and Foreign produced 
inputs, 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 and 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹 , and the quantity of each intermediate input, 𝑥𝑥. 𝛾𝛾 > 1 indicates 
                                                          
3 The model can also be solved using CES preferences; the Cobb-Douglas form used here makes the 
solution much simpler, and does not detract from the main results of the paper.  
4 We ignore the integer constraint on 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗.  
5 Alternatively, some of the intermediate inputs may be interpreted as assembly services, so that 




that Home has a comparative technological advantage in final good 1, while Foreign 
has a comparative technological advantage in final good 2. 𝛽𝛽 > 0 measures the payoff 
from the division of labour. The larger the number of intermediate inputs 𝑐𝑐, the 
greater the division of labour, and the larger the output of the final good, 
analogously to Adam Smith’s pin factory example. Note that the production function 
of final goods exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to the quantity of each 
input, and increasing returns with respect to the number of different inputs. The 
constant returns to scale feature makes the production function compatible with 
perfect competition: a larger firm does not have a cost advantage relative to a 
smaller firm.  
 
Consider the case where the two countries do not trade with each other. Here we 
analyse the Home country; the solution for the Foreign country is analogous. In this 
case, Foreign-produced intermediates are not available for use in the production of 
Home-produced final goods, and all Home-produced intermediates are used at Home. 
Because of the Cobb-Douglas preferences, each country will produce both final goods 
in autarky, and because of constant returns to scale with respect to the quantity of 
each input in final good production, the production possibilities frontier (PPF) is a 
straight line; there are constant opportunity costs. As a result, we can allocate the 
output of each intermediate good to the two final goods as follows (see Appendix B 
for a derivation):  
𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻                                    𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻    (6) 
Where 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 is the output of each intermediate good in Home. Hence, the production 
functions in Home are (making use of 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗 = 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗):  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽+1𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻     (7a) 
𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽+1(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻    (7b) 
Since all intermediate inputs are produced using the same technology, and since all 
intermediate goods are used in fixed proportions in the production of final goods, the 
labour used in each intermediate input is also the same. Hence 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻⁄ =1 𝑟𝑟⁄ . The size of the labour force influences only the number of intermediate goods, 
not the output of each intermediate good. This result of the model is similar to 
Krugman (1980), in which changing labour endowments results in a different number 
of varieties produced, but not the scale of production of each variety.  
  
Substituting into the production functions (7a) and (7b) gives:  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻                                    𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻   (8) 
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Since there is no international trade, Home consumers can only consume Home-
produced output. Therefore, the Home consumer’s per capita utility under autarky 
is:  
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻
𝐴𝐴 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻)𝛽𝛽(𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃)𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝜃𝜃     (9) 
Per capita utility is increasing in the size of the Home labour force 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻, the parameter 
𝑟𝑟 indicating the number of intermediate sectors, the gain from the division of labour 
𝛽𝛽, and the technology parameter 𝛾𝛾. In addition, utility has a U-shaped relationship 
with the share of final good 1 in expenditure, 𝜃𝜃.  
 
4 International trade 
 
When international trade is allowed, both intermediate inputs and final goods can be 
freely traded across countries. Proposition 1 shows that both countries are always 
specialized in free trade:  
 
Proposition 1: In free trade, Home is specialized in final good 1 and Foreign is 
specialized in final good 2.  
 
Proposition 1 follows from the fact that production of final goods from intermediate 
goods is costless. Therefore, the efficient allocation of resources (the integrated 
equilibrium; see Helpman and Krugman (1985)) is achieved when each country 
produces the good(s) in which it has a technological advantage. Note that this 
implies that, if a country is more productive at producing both final goods, then both 
final goods will be produced in that country; it is absolute advantage, not 
comparative advantage, which drives this result.  
 
Making use of the results in the previous section and solving for the production 
functions (5a) and (5b) gives:  
𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)    (10a) 
𝑄𝑄2𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾(1 − 𝜃𝜃)(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽 (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)    (10b) 
Production of each final good uses intermediate goods produced in both countries, 
and consumers wish to consume both final goods. Hence international trade occurs in 
both intermediate and final goods6.  
                                                          
6 If trade in intermediate goods is defined to be intra-industry trade, while trade in final goods is 
inter-industry, then the model predicts both inter- and intra-industry trade. More details are provided 
in Appendix C, where it is shown that the model’s prediction of the share of intra-industry trade is 




Since preferences are homothetic and identical across countries, each country will 
consume a fraction of the total output of each final good which is proportional to its 
relative size 𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗 (𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)⁄ . Hence, the Home consumer’s per capita utility under free 
trade is:   
𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 = 𝛾𝛾(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)1−𝜃𝜃     (11) 
Define the gains from trade as the ratio between free trade (11) and autarkic utility 
(9). The gains from trade for the Home country are: 
𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻 = 𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑈𝑈𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 = �𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝛽𝛽 𝛾𝛾1−𝜃𝜃 > 1      (12) 
Hence there are gains from trade, which arise from two sources. First, international 
trade leads to more intermediate goods being available, which leads to greater 
division of labour. Second, international trade allows the two countries to specialize 
in their comparative advantage final goods. The following comparative statics results 
can be shown:  
𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
< 0             𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
> 0             𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽
> 0             𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
> 0             𝑑𝑑𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻
𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃
< 0   (13) 
As might be expected, the gains from trade increase the smaller is the country, or 
the larger is the trading partner. In fact, from equation (11), it can be seen that 
utility under free trade depends on the size of the world economy rather than the 
size of each country, and is identical for both countries. The larger the gains from 
the division of labour 𝛽𝛽 or the larger the comparative technological advantage in the 
final good 𝛾𝛾, the larger the gains from trade. Similarly, the larger the expenditure 
share of final good 1, 𝜃𝜃 , the smaller the gains from trade, since Home has 
comparative advantage in good 1.  
 
It is possible to decompose the total gains from trade into the component derived 
from comparative advantage in final goods production and the component derived 
from the division of labour. To obtain the Home country’s gains from trade based on 
comparative advantage alone, set 𝛽𝛽 = 0 in the gains from trade equation (12) to 
obtain:  
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 = 𝛾𝛾1−𝜃𝜃       (14) 
Similarly, set 𝛾𝛾 = 1 in equation (12) to obtain the Home country’s gains from trade 
based on the division of labour alone:  
𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 = �𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 �𝛽𝛽      (15) 
Total gains from trade are simply the product of the two components:  
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𝐺𝐺𝐻𝐻 = 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 × 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿      (16) 
Note from equation (14) that the gain from comparative advantage is independent of 
country sizes, whereas from equation (15) the gain from the division of labour 
increases the smaller is the country relative to its trading partner. Hence the primary 
source of the gains from trade for small countries is the division of labour, while for 
large countries it is comparative advantage. We have:  
 
Proposition 2: The smaller is a country relative to its trading partner, the greater the 
importance of the division of labour relative to comparative advantage as a source of 
the gains from trade.  
 
As noted in Section 3 above, the two countries are symmetric in every way except 
one: their size. Similarly, the two final goods and all intermediate goods are also 
symmetric in every way, and assembly of final goods from intermediate goods is 
costless. As a result, the total value of intermediate goods output is equal to the 
total value of final goods output, and the two final goods are produced in proportion 
to the parameters of the Cobb-Douglas utility function and have equal prices. 
However, with identical homothetic preferences, the larger country will consume a 
larger fraction of each final good, in direct proportion to the country’s size. As a 
result, the share of the final good in a country’s exports will be negatively related to 
the country’s size, while the share of intermediate goods will be positively related to 
the country’s size.  
 
To make this more concrete, the value of Home’s exports of the final good is:  
𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹
𝑃𝑃1𝑄𝑄1 = 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃1 �𝑑𝑑𝜃𝜃𝑟𝑟 � (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽+1 = 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃1𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽   (17) 
Where 𝑃𝑃1 is the price of good 1. Recall from equation (6) that a fraction 1 − 𝜃𝜃 of 
each Home-produced intermediate good is used in the production of final good 2, 
which is produced in Foreign. The value of Home’s exports of intermediate goods is:  (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻     (18) 
Where 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 is the price of each intermediate good. The price of each intermediate good 
does not depend on the country’s size. Since we have assumed in Section 3 above 
that wage rates are equal across countries, the prices of intermediate goods are also 
the same across countries and can be normalised to 1. However, the price of the final 
good does depend on the size of the world economy, since a larger world economy 
implies more intermediate goods and hence lower production cost through greater 
division of labour. The relative price of the final good can be obtained from the 
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assumptions that assembly of the final goods is costless and profits are zero, so the 
value of final good output is equal to the value of the intermediate inputs used in its 
production. That is, from equation (10a):  
𝑃𝑃1𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 = 𝑃𝑃1𝛾𝛾𝜃𝜃(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)    (19) 
While the value of the intermediate inputs used in its production is, substituting 
from equation (6):  
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻(𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻 + 𝑐𝑐𝐹𝐹)𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝐻𝐻 =  𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝜃𝜃   (20) 
If profits are zero, equations (19) and (20) are equal to one another, and setting 
𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 = 1  gives the price of the Home-produced final good as a function of the 
endowments:  
𝑃𝑃1 = �𝛾𝛾(𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)𝛽𝛽�−1     (21) 
Substituting this into the value of Home’s exports of the final good (17) and 
simplifying gives:  
𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹       (22) 
Combining this with the value of Home’s exports of intermediate goods (18), Home’s 
exports of the final good as a share of Home’s total exports is:  
𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹[𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻]−1     (23) 
Differentiating this expression with respect to 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 gives the relationship between the 
share of final goods exports and country size:  
𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
=  −𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝜃𝜃(1 − 𝜃𝜃)[𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 + (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻]−2 < 0   (24) 
This gives:  
 
Proposition 3: There is a negative relationship between country size and the share of 
final goods in its exports, and a positive relationship between country size and the 
share of intermediate goods in its exports.  
 
Proposition 3 is of course the same as the empirical relationship obtained in Section 
2. Since the two countries have symmetric technologies, country size as measured by 
GDP is the same as country size measured by population. It can be shown that, 
because preferences are homothetic and identical across countries, introducing a 
parameter which makes Home uniformly more productive than Foreign in all goods, 
has no impact on the results of the model, apart from giving Home workers a higher 








In this paper, we document the presence of a negative relationship between the size 
of a country, and the share of consumption goods in its total exports. We develop a 
simple model of international trade which is able to explain this negative 
relationship. The model is based on the division of labour and comparative 
advantage, going beyond the usual assumption of external scale economies to clarify 
the implications of the division of labour. Unlike most of the prior literature, the 
model is perfectly competitive throughout. The extent of the division of labour is 
determined by the size of the market, whereas the gains from international trade 
arise from the division of the production process into increasing numbers of stages 
and from comparative advantage in final goods. It is shown that large countries gain 
relatively more from comparative advantage than from the division of labour, 
whereas the opposite is true for small countries. Countries exchange intermediate 
inputs which are used in the production of final goods, which are then traded with 
each other. In addition, the model predicts, consistently with the empirical evidence, 
that larger countries will have a smaller share of consumption goods in their exports, 
and a larger share of intermediate goods.  
 
The model developed in this paper relies quite heavily on several strong assumptions, 
especially those regarding the production of intermediate inputs and final goods. As 
discussed in the paper, these assumptions help sidestep some analytically difficult 
issues. Future work will address these issues directly, as well as developing a more 
general approach that would be amenable to the analysis of related issues such as 
trade costs. Nevertheless, the present paper helps to shed some light not only on the 
relationship between country size and intermediate goods trade, but also on the role 
of the division of labour, and the relationship between the division of labour and 




Appendix A: Sensitivity analysis 
 
We perform three sensitivity checks on the results of Table 1. First, note that the 
sample is an unbalanced panel; with 172 countries and 21 years, a balanced panel 
would have 3,612 observations, but Table 1 only has 2,583 observations. Therefore, 
we may be concerned with non-random sample attrition. To address this concern, we 
perform the analysis with a panel which includes only countries with at least 12 
observations. This reduces the number of countries, to 137, and the number of 
observations, to 2,374, but increases the average number of observations per country, 
from 15.0 to 17.3.  
 
A second concern is that the regression analysis in Table 1 gives equal importance to 
all countries in the sample. We consider two approaches to addressing this concern. 
First, we perform a regression in which the observations are weighted by the natural 
log of population, so that larger countries are given greater weight in the regression9. 
Second we drop all countries which are in the bottom decile in terms of population 
and GDP; this corresponds to a population threshold of approximately 440,000 
people and a GDP threshold of approximately $8 billion. This results in the exclusion 
of 49 countries in total; these are mainly small island states such as Seychelles and 
Samoa, but also includes a few wealthy but small countries such as Brunei and 
Luxembourg.  
 
The results of these sensitivity analyses are reported in Table A1, where the same 
three specifications as Table 1 are reported: with country fixed effects only, with 
country and year fixed effects, and with country and year fixed effects and country-
specific time trends. Columns (1) to (3) report the results for the more balanced 
sample; columns (4) to (6) report the results for the weighted regression; and 
columns (7) to (9) report the results for dropping small countries. The results of 
Table 1 are robust to all of these specification changes, which suggests that the 
results presented in Table 1 are not driven by sample selection.  
  
                                                          
9 Alternative weights, such as the natural log of GDP, yield very similar results.  
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Table A1: Sensitivity analysis. Dependent variable = consumption goods share of exports. 
 More-balanced panel  Weighted regression  Excluding small countries 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) ln(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃, 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) -0.078 -0.058 -0.103  -0.075 -0.063 -0.089  -0.070 -0.052 -0.102 
 (0.019)** (0.030)+ (0.031)**  (0.018)** (0.029)* (0.032)**  (0.018)** (0.024)* (0.032)** ln 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 0.032 0.035 -0.003  0.041 0.041 0.005  0.050 0.053 0.008 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.090)  (0.035) (0.036) (0.090)  (0.033) (0.033) (0.090) 
𝑅𝑅2 0.07 0.09 0.51  0.06 0.08 0.52  0.06 0.09 0.48 
𝑁𝑁 × 𝑇𝑇  2,374 2,374 2,374  2,583 2,583 2,583  2,140 2,140 2,140 
N 137 137 137  172 172 172  123 123 123 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Country time trend   Yes    Yes    Yes 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors clustered by country. + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Estimation is by OLS 
with fixed effects as defined in the table. All specifications include observations from 1995 to 2015.  
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 Appendix B: The autarkic equilibrium 
 
To obtain the autarkic equilibrium for the Home country, set the slope of the PPF 
equal to the slope of the indifference curve. From the Cobb-Douglas utility function 







      (A1) 
To derive the PPF, first note that because of constant returns to scale in the 





     (A2) 
Where 𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 and 𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻 are the total labour used in the Home country in producing the 
intermediate inputs used in goods 1 and 2. Rearranging and substituting into the 
production functions, noting that in autarky, 𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻  and 𝐿𝐿1𝐻𝐻 + 𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 , 
we have:  




𝛽𝛽+1                      and                          𝐿𝐿2𝐻𝐻 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1  (A4) 
Hence the equation of the PPF is:  
𝐿𝐿 = 𝐿𝐿1 + 𝐿𝐿2 = 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻
𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻
𝛽𝛽+1 + 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1    (A5) 
Rearranging in terms of 𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻:  
𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽+1 − 𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻𝑑𝑑     (A6) 








     (A7) 
Setting this equal to the slope of the indifference curve (A1), making use of the fact 
that in autarky 𝐶𝐶1𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 𝑄𝑄1𝐻𝐻 and 𝐶𝐶2𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 = 𝑄𝑄2𝐻𝐻, and substituting from the production 
functions (A3) gives the relationship between 𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 and 𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻:  
𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 = 𝜃𝜃1−𝜃𝜃 𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻     (A8) 
Making use of 𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 + 𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻 = 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻 gives:  
𝑥𝑥1𝐻𝐻 = 𝜃𝜃𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻                               𝑥𝑥2𝐻𝐻 = (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻   (A9) 






Appendix C: Intra-industry trade 
 
From Section 4, Home’s exports and imports may be summarised as follows 
(assuming 𝑝𝑝𝐻𝐻 = 𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹 = 1):  
Home exports of final good 1:   𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 
Home imports of final good 2:  (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
Home exports of intermediate goods:  (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 
Home imports of intermediate goods:  𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 
Suppose that the two final goods are defined as two separate industries, and 
intermediate goods as a third industry. Then, defining the Grubel-Lloyd index of 
intra-industry trade in each industry 𝑘𝑘 as:  
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 = 1 − |𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘−𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘|𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘+𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘      (A1) 
Where 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑀𝑀 are exports and imports. We have:  
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = � 2𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]−1               𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖         𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 ≤ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻2(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]−1       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖       𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 ≥ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻     (A2) 
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑 1 = 𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑑 2 = 0    (A3) 
And, defining the trade-weighted Grubel-Lloyd index as:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 = ∑ �𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘 × � 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘+𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘∑ (𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘+𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘 ��𝑘𝑘     (A4) 
We have:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 = � 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]−1               𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 ≤ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻[(1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 + 𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]−1       𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 ≥ (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻  (A5) 










= −𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)[(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]2 < 0  (A6) 









= 𝜃𝜃(1−𝜃𝜃)(𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹)[(1−𝜃𝜃)𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻+𝜃𝜃𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹]2 > 0  (A7) 
If 𝜃𝜃 is assumed to be equal to 0.5, then the interpretation is straightforward. If the 
Home country is larger than the Foreign country (the first case), the TWGL index is 
negatively related to Home country size, while the reverse is true if Home is smaller 
than Foreign (the second case). In other words, the TWGL index is positively related 
to the size of the smaller of the two countries, and negatively related to the size of 
the larger of the two countries. This of course is the same prediction as in models of 
trade under imperfect competition, and which has received empirical support 
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